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Abstract— The development of the Internet of Things (IoT) and 5th
generation wireless network (5G) is set to push the smart agricul-
ture to the next level since the massive and real-time data can be
collected to monitor the status of crops and livestock, logistics
management, and other important information. Recently, COVID-
19 has attracted more human attention to food safety, which also
has a positive impact on smart agriculture market share. However,
the security and privacy concern for smart agriculture has become
more prominent. Since smart agriculture implies working with large
sets of data, which usually sensitive, some are even confidential,
and once leakage it can expose user privacy. Meanwhile, consid-
ering the data publishing of smart agriculture helps the public or
investors to real-timely anticipate risks and benefits, these data are also a public resource. To balance the data publishing
and data privacy, in this paper, a privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme with a flexibility property uses ElGamal
Cryptosystem is proposed. It is proved to be secure, private, and flexible with the analysis and performance simulation.
Index Terms— Smart Agriculture, Data Aggregation, Data Privacy, Flexibility, Data Publishing.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the growing world population, people demandsustainably produced food. Meanwhile, especially due
to the COVID-19 pandemic, a growing concern has been paid
on food security. For example, many people want to know
more about the origin of their products. Smart agriculture can
meet these challenges and help farmers to seize growth op-
portunities. The development of the IoT and 5G technologies
have brought changes to smart agriculture. More importantly,
boosting the digital agriculture process.
IoT is used greatly to collect agriculture-related information
like temperature, humidity, soil PH, soil nutrition levels, water
level, animal stress or disease, etc., to inform decisions on
irrigation, pest management, fertilizer applications, harvesting,
and early detection and treatment of animal disease [1]. These
data, which are real-time collected, will be transmitted to
Cloud through 5G for easy storage and access [2], [3]. In this
way, farmers can use their smartphones to remotely monitor
the status of crops or livestock any time and anywhere, and
make timely judgements and arrangements. Also, these data
can help the government, companies, and academic commu-
nities to make some policy and economy decisions or conduct
research. Therefore, these data should be regarded as a public
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social resource.
However, the agriculture data, same as the personal power
messages, personal travel information, and personal health
data, often involves users’ privacy [4], [5]. For example, these
data will expose the income status of farmers. In fact, Cloud
can not always be fully trusted, considering the drawbacks
and flaws of the current Cloud in terms of privacy-preserving
and lack of security support. Therefore, these data cannot be
directly shared by Cloud. How to get a trade-off between
farmers’ privacy and data availability is an urgent problem
to be solved [6], [7].
IoT privacy-preserving data aggregation is an essential mean
to balance farmers’ privacy and data availability, and it is
also one of the most important contents for the development
of IoT and smart agriculture [8] [9]. Privacy-preserving data
aggregation helps the cloud to calculate the sum of specific
data, even if Cloud knows nothing about any single data,
which makes it as a widely accepted method of protecting
privacy. It not only protects farmers’ privacy from being
violated but also ensures that the data usability can be achieved
[10]. Considerable interest has excited in this field in recent
years, and various outstanding works have been proposed by
researchers.
To solve the privacy and efficiency problems in the smart
grid, Li et al. in [11] and Lu et al. in [12] proposed privacy-
preserving data aggregation schemes, respectively. The struc-
ture of these solutions can be divided into three parts: the
bottom user, the intermediate aggregation center, and the top
data center. Specifically, the user encrypted these collected
data using homomorphic encryption and sent the results to a
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nearby aggregation center. The aggregation center aggregates
the ciphertext and sents the result to a remote data center.
Since the aggregated data is only 1/n in length, these schemes
are very effective. Later, Fan et al. [13] indicated the above
schemes are not secure since they can not resist the attacks
from the internal members of the data center. The authors
proposed an improved scheme in [13] using a blind factor
distributed by an offline trusted authority(TA). The scheme is
more secure due to the presence of blind factors, but it is less
robust since it requires a TA.
In 2017, Badra et al. proposed a new scheme that is secure,
efficient, and robust in [14]. It employed the blind factor to
resist the attack from internal members. To improve efficiency,
the authors adopt a very simple encryption algorithm, but it
often leads the scheme to become less secure in fact. Based on
previous works, in 2019, Song et al. proposed a scheme named
DMDA in [15]. In addition to meeting the demands of privacy,
security, efficiency, and robustness, the proposal also meets
some dynamic requirements. However, it does not satisfy a
more advanced dynamic demand. In essence, DMDA only
supports farmers’ joining and withdrawing. Considering such
kind of aggregation scenery, an aggregation system involves
four members: Alice, Bob, Carol, and Dave. It is required to
aggregate the first data of Alice, the second data of Bob and
the third data of Carol, but not Dave’s data. To the best of
our knowledge, none of the existing schemes can solve this
problem.
In this paper, a flexible privacy-preserving data aggrega-
tion scheme based on virtual aggregation area, which uses
some basic encryption tools such as ElGamal encryption and
blind factor, is proposed. With the ingenious use of blinding
factors, this proposal supports that the data collector phase
and privacy-preserving data aggregation do not need to be
done simultaneously. The cloud collects and stores farmers’
data in the ciphertext. Then the control center can select some
ciphertexts of the data stored in the cloud, and the cloud will
calculate the aggregated plaintext and return the results. In
these processes, none can get any information about farmers’
data.
The analysis shows that the proposed scheme meets the
requirements of security, authentication, integrity, privacy, and
efficiency. Moreover, some features of the proposed scheme
are listed as follow:
Security: it is a basic requirement of cryptographic protocols
[16], [17]. The main purpose of security is to ensure that
both parties can communicate securely without interruption
from the adversary [18], [19].It can be divided into three
aspects: confidentiality, authentication and integrity. Confiden-
tiality means that only the specified recipients can access the
message. While other unauthorized parties, even if they obtain
it somehow, are still unable to understand the content due to
the lack of necessary knowledge. Authentication means the
message recipients can determine the identity of a legitimate
message sender. In other words, the message, which is from
the adversary or unknown parties, will not be received or pro-
cessed. Integrity means the message received by the receiver
is the message the sender wants him to get. The message
would not be modified or destroyed during transmission. For
example, Alice sends AB to Bob, and Bob gets AB rather than
A, AC, ABC, or BA. Also, it includes ensuring information
non-repudiation and authenticity.
Privacy: it is different from confidentiality. Confidentiality
means that the data is secure in the communication, and
the adversary cannot get the plaintext even if he gets all
the transmitted messages [20], [21]. Privacy here means that
the data is secure in all processes of the protocol, and any
party, except the data owner, gets nothing about the data
even if it is a participant of the protocol [22]. For example,
Alice sends a message to Bob and Eve is an eavesdropper.
Confidentiality requires Eve to get nothing of Alice’s data
even if she eavesdrops the message. Privacy meant that not
only could Eve not get anything about Alice’s data, neither
could Bob. However, Bob can leverage Alice’s data to some
extent [23], [24].
Virtual aggregation area: it is the environment in which the
aggregation protocol runs. It includes all participants in the
protocol and the communication methods between the partic-
ipants. The traditional aggregation area usually includes four
types of participants: smart devices, aggregators, aggregation
centers, and control centers [11]. Participants communicate
with each other through a purpose-built network. Generally,
the aggregation center of the traditional aggregation area is
fully trusted [13], it never adopts proactive attacks and is never
defeated. The virtual aggregation area is a bit different. It has
three kind of participants: smart devices, Cloud, and control
center [14], [15]. The virtual aggregation area, which does
not require a special network, is established on the Internet.
The communications between participants is conducted via the
Internet. The cloud is often unrusted, which leads to higher
privacy requirements. Therefore, the proposed scheme requires
farmers data to be safe, even if the cloud adopts an active
attack or is defeated by an adversary.
Flexibility: it is an advanced feature for a data aggre-
gation scheme. Normally, before the protocol runs, tradi-
tional privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes select
some farmer, whose data to be aggregated. Then transfer some
secure data to these farmer in a secure way. Finally, the
encrypted secure data can be aggregated and decrypted [6].
However, flexible solutions are different. A flexible scheme
aggregates the collected data rather than collecting data for
aggregation [25]. For example, a farmer installs a PH sensor
in farm. The PH sensor collects farm PH data in real-time.
But this data will be stored in the cloud in ciphertext, taking
into account the cost of storage. The farmer can download this
data when needed. This means that farmers do not collect and
store their own data for aggregation. However, some other
organizations, such as company or governments, may also
need to use this data. Considering the demand for privacy,
aggregation can be adopted to meet the requirements. In
the proposed scheme, the control center (CC) generates the
aggregation areas according to the requirements and the data
stored in the cloud. The cloud can complete the aggregation
if all data owners agree. In other words, the purpose of
aggregation is to meet the demands of other organizations that
use data without compromising farmers’ privacy. Therefore,
farmers should not be required to collect data for aggregation.
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II. SYSTEMS MODEL
A. Communication Model
The system of this scheme is illustrated in Fig. 3, which
consists of four parties: CC, Cloud, user and SDs. We elaborate
to introduce them in the following part.
Control Center(CC): CC only takes part in the Aggrega-
tion Phase, and determines the aggregation space MA. CC
transmits MA to the Cloud and receives the result from it.
Since the communication between CC and Cloud is not the
focus of our research, for simplicity, it is assumed to be secure.
Cloud: Cloud is an important participant of this scheme,
which takes part in the Data Collection Phase and the Ag-
gregation Phase. The Cloud collects data from smart devices
and periodically stores it in its database. When the Cloud
receives an aggregation request from CC, it aggregates user’
data according to the requirements and decrypts the aggregated
results with the help of user. Normally, the Cloud is assumed
won’t to initiate any active attacks, but it tends to know
user’ privacy by analyzing the legally acquired data. Due to
Cloud is a public social resource that anyone can access, the
communication between user and Cloud is via a public channel
which is easy to be monitored.
Smart Device(SDs): SDs are the data collector owned by
user. They collect agriculture data and upload it regularly. In
this paper, a farmer can have multiple SDs, for example, a
farmer has a smart meter and a smart watch, but an SD can
only belong to one farmer. SDs often collect kinds of user’
data, encrypt it using user’ secure key, and upload it to the
Cloud. SDs are considered to have limited computing and
storage resources. Therefore, they only attend Data Collection
Phase that does not require too much calculation.
User: a user is the holder of SDs and data, especially, in
smart agriculture, farmer is the user. Users take part in the
protocol through smart phone or PCs, so they are assumed
to have a little computing and storage resources. Before
aggregation, the Cloud needs the support of all data owners.
Users can refuse to take part in an aggregation if they think it
may destroy their privacy. If one data owner reject this activity,
the aggregation cannot continue. In general, most Users are
considered trustworthy.
B. Design Goals
This scheme is designed to aggregate data in a virtual
area without leaking any single farmer’s data. In the big
data environment, aggregation is helpful for data analysis and
supports management and research of the IoT. To ensure the
protocol goes, some important requirements should be met,
such as confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and privacy.
Moreover, flexibility and efficiency are also important to our
scheme.
Confidentiality: Confidentiality means the encryption
method is secure. It is impossible to calculate the plaintext
from a ciphertext without the security key.
Authentication: Since data transmission is via a public way,
the entities receiving the data have to verify the identities of the
data senders. Otherwise, the scheme is vulnerable to various
attacks, such as the man-in-the-middle attack.
Integrity: Due to the noise pollution in the communication
channel or malicious tampering by some adversaries, the
information received by the data receivers may be inconsistent
with the original one. For ensuring the fake content is not
considered to be the correct message received by the data
receiver, it should be checked for tampering.
Privacy: Privacy is the most important purpose of a privacy-
preserving aggregation scheme. Due to the Cloud is not
completely trusted, Cloud should not obtain the plaintext of
farmer data.
Flexibility: Flexibility is one of the most important con-
tributions of the proposed scheme. Different from traditional
privacy-preserving aggregation methods in physical area, the
aggregation schemes in virtual area require higher flexibility.
For example, when some analysis tasks require farmers data,
the data center can provide some aggregate values. Traditional
aggregation schemes can only calculate the aggregation result
of a specified aggregation area, which is determined before
data collection. Flexibility requires that the aggregation can
be achieved without pre-defining the to be aggregated are in
advance. Namely, any area is allowed to aggregate.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. ElGamal Cryptosystem
ElGamal Cryptosystem includes a public key encryption
scheme and a signature scheme. They are introduced sepa-
rately as follows.
1) ElGamal Public Key Encryption: The ElGamal Cryptosys-
tem are based on discrete logarithms, it needs a large prime
p, and p − 1 has at least one large prime factor. Otherwise,
computing discrete logarithms is easy (see [26]).
Key Generation: Let p be a large prime and α be a
primitive element mod p and they are public elements. Secret
key x is choosen between 0 and p−1, public key is calculated
by y = αx mod p.
Encryption: The plaintext m is encrypted into the cipher-
text
(c1, c2) = (α
r,m+ yr) mod p,
where r is a random number between 0 and p− 1.
Decrption: The ciphertext
(
c1, c2
)
is decrypted into plain-
text m by
m = c2 − (c1)x.
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TABLE I
NOTATIONS
Acronym Descriptions
i The ID number of farmer, such as Ui express the
farmer whose ID number is i
SDi The smart meter which is controlled by Ui
t A data tag, such as mit represents the message
belonging to Ui and the tag is t
MA The aggregation space includes the selected data’s
related information (i, t)
UA The aggregation area consists of the user’ ID number
i, who have no less than one message ∈MA
xi/yi U
′
is secret/public key
xc/yc Cloud’s secret/public key
pi The decryption piece of Ui
2) ElGamal Signature Scheme: This section introduces a
signature scheme about a message m being signed to a pair(
s1, s2
)
which satisfy the equation (1):
αm = ys
1
(s1)s
2
. (1)
The Signing Procedure
In this part, the signature function SFx(m) will be intro-
duced, which signs the message m using the private key x.
The details are as following:
Step 1: Select a fresh random number k which is between 0
and p− 1, such that gcd (k, p− 1) = 1 mod p.
Step 2: Calculate s1 = αk mod p.
Step 3: Calculate s2 = m−xs1k mod (p− 1), it has a solution
for s2 if k satisfies gcd (k, p− 1) = 1 mod p.
The signature s = (s1, s2).
The Verification Procedure
In this part, the verification method is introduced as follows.
Given m, s1 and s2, it is easy to verify the signature by
checking the equation αm = ys
1
(s1)s
2
.
Obviously, if there are more than one signatures such as
{yi,mi, si}, where i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , n and n > 1, they can
be verified together by checking the equation αΣi mi =
Πi y
s1i
i (s
1
i )
s2i .
IV. FLEXIBLE PRIVACY-PRESERVING AGGREGATION
SCHEME
In this phase, we introduce a privacy-preserving aggregation
scheme based on a random area, which includes three parts:
System Initialization, Data Collection and Data Aggregation.
The parameters and notations are described in Table I. And
an optional data verification is also provided to balance
lightweight and security.
A. System Initialization
Before the implementation of the protocol, some parameters
should be determined, for example which system parameters
generation are selected by Cloud and which farmer parameters
are selected by themselves.
1) System Parameter Generation: Let e is a bilinear map
e : G1 ×G1 → GT , G1 and GT are cycle groups of order p
which p is a large prime and α be a generator of G1. Moreover,
a secure hash function H1 is selected. {e,G1, GT , p, α,H1}
is published to all members of system.
2) Farmer Parameter Generation: Ui chooses a secret key xi
and computes a public key yi = αxi mod p, which i ∈ [1, n]
is the number of user. Then Ui keeps the xi and publishes yi.
Cloud chooses a secret key xc and computes a public key
yc = α
xc mod p. Then Cloud keeps the xc and publishes yc.
B. Data Collection Phase
In this phase, SDs will encrypt, sign and upload its data to
Cloud. Moreover, Cloud will verify the received and store the
legitimate data. For convenience, we illustrate data collection
phase by a case: SDi encrypts his message mit to cit, then it
uploads cit to Cloud. More details are introduced as follow:
Step 1: SDi selects a fresh random number rit between 0
and p− 1 and calculates cit = (c1it, c2it) = (αrit mod p,mit +
yriti mod p).
Step 2: SDi signs cit to sit which sit = SFxi(c2it).
Step 3: SDi calculates the message authentication code hi =
H1(i||cit||sit||T )xi which T is current time, then it uploads
{cit, sit, hi, T} to Cloud.
Step 4: When Cloud receives {cit, sit, hi, T}, it needs to
run the following 3 verification: 1. verifies if T is fresh; 2.
verifies if the transmitted message is integrity by e(hi, α) =
e(H1(i||cit||sit||T ), yi); 3. verifies the signature is correct by
the equation αc
2
it = y
s1it
i s
1
it
s2it . If all yes, Cloud stores (cit, sit).
C. Aggregation Phase
In this phase, Cloud aggregates users’ data, which are stored
in the Cloud in the ciphertext, and decrypts it with the help of
related users. Which data are to be aggregated is determined
by CC. Moreover, during the aggression operation, CC, Cloud
and the attackers are unable to get any information on user
data.
However, Cloud is not always trusted by the users, they
may worry Cloud gives a forged aggregated result. Sometimes,
users may want to ensure the correctness of the received
result. Therefore, an optional authentication is proposed in
this scheme. If a farmer is happy to verify the received data,
he/she has to bear more complex calculations and inefficient
communications. As a return, he/she can enjoy better security
due to the verification.
1) Aggregation: In this part, Cloud initially aggregates ci-
phertexts cit which (i, t) ∈ MA and sends the result to Ui,
where i ∈ UA. More details are as follow:
Step 1: CC determines an aggregation space MA according
to demand and sends it to Cloud.
Step 2: Cloud picks out the related ciphertexts cit from its
database, where (i, t) ∈MA, and calculates
c =
∑
(i,t)∈MA
c2it mod p.
Step 3: Cloud calculates the authentication code hc =
H1(c||c1it||MA||T ′)xc .
Step 4: Cloud sends {c, c1it,MA, T ′, hc} to Ui.
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2) Initial Decryption: In this part, the user need to complete
three steps: 1) verify the received message and decide whether
to participate; 2) generate the decryption piece; 3) send the
decryption data to Cloud. Especially, in step 1, user not only
needs to verify the legality of the received message but also
can select to verify if the aggregated result does be the sum
of the data in MA. More details are as follow.
Step 1: After receiving {c, c1it,MA, T ′, hc}, Ui firstly checks
the freshness of received messages by T ′ and verifies its in-
tegrity by the equation e(hc, α) = e(H1(c||c1it||MA||T ′), yc).
Then Ui checks MA and decides whether to take part in this
aggregation. If all yes, Ui will product the decryption piece.
Otherwise, Ui can refuse the aggregation.
Next, Ui verifies if the aggregated result is the sum of the
data in MA. If Ui believes that Cloud is honest, he/she can
directly generate the decryption piece for Cloud. If Ui prefers
to start the verification, he/she can perform the following
processes.
Firstly, Ui asks {sjt|(j, t) ∈MA} from Cloud.
Secondly, Ui verifies the correctness of c by the equation (2)
αc =
∏
(j,t)∈MA
(yj)
s1jt(s1jt)
s2jt mod p. (2)
If the equation (2) is working, c passes the verification. Then
Ui can calculate the decryption piece.
Step 2: Ui calculates the decryption piece pi by
pi = c−
∑
(i,t)∈MA
(c1it)
xi +
∑
j∈UA
j 6=i
(j − i)yxij mod p. (3)
Step 3: Ui calculates the authentication code h′i =
H1(i||pit||T ′′)xi and sends {pit, T ′′, h′i} to Cloud.
3) Decryption: When Cloud receives the {pit, T ′′, h′i}, it
verifies if the message is fresh and then verifies its integrity
by calculating e(h′i, α) = e(H1(i||pit||T ′′), yi).
If Cloud obtains all decryption pieces pi from user, it can
calculate the sum m of mi,t, where (i, t) ∈MA. The process
is as follow
m = c+
∑
i∈UA
(pi − c) mod p.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Confidentiality
The confidentiality of our scheme can divide two parts, one
is the confidentiality of data collection phase and another is
the confidentiality of aggregation phase. Since the confiden-
tiality of these two parts are completed in different ways, we
introduce them respectively:
Confidentiality in Data Collection Phase: Before a data
is uploaded, it should be encrypted as cit = (c1it, c
2
it) =
(αri mod p,mit + y
ri
i mod p). Even an adversary eavesdrop
cit, he cannot get the plaintext mit from cit due to he
cannot get the secure key xi. According to the [26], no one
can calculate plaintext from ciphertext without the secure
key. Therefore, the Data Collection Phase can satisfy the
requirement of confidentiality.
Confidentiality in Aggregation Phase: In this phase, there
are two messages cit and pi which contain users’ privacy data.
We have proved the adversary cannot get any information from
cit, and then we will prove the adversary also cannot get any
information about mi from pi. pi is analyzed as follow.
pi =c−
∑
(i,t)∈MA
c1it
xi
+
∑
j∈UA
j 6=i
(j − i)yxij
=
∑
(i,t)∈MA
mit +
∑
(j, t) ∈ MA
j 6= i
(mjt + y
rj
j )
+
∑
j∈UA
j 6=i
(j − i)yxij mod p.
(4)
According to (4), if someone wants to calculate mit from
pi, he/she has to know
∑j 6=i
j∈UA(j − i)yxij mod p. This means
he/she knows at least n−1 secure keys of the n members of the
aggregation area. According to our assumption, most users are
trustworthy. Therefore nobody can get so many secure keys.
In short, it is impossible to calculate mit from pi.
B. Authentication
In this section, we will prove that Cloud can ensure the
source of the messages in Data Collection Phase and Cloud
and users can ensure the source of the messages in Aggregation
Phase, which means the adversary cannot forge a message to
pass the authentication.
In Data Collection Phase, Cloud will receive the
{cit, sit, hi, T} which is from Ui’s SD. For ensuring the
message does come from Ui’s SD, Cloud verifies this message
by checking the equation e(hi, α) = e(H1(i||cit||sit||T ), yi)
with Ui’s public key yi. If an adversary wants to produce hi,
he/she has to obtain the secret key xi of Ui, which is obviously
impossible.
Moreover, in Aggregation Phase, Cloud and users authen-
ticate with each other using hc and h′i, which is very similar
to Data Collection Phase. Therefore, it is impossible for the
adversary to forge messages and pass the authentication.
What’s more, sometimes, the user may want to know if
the c, which he/she received in step 4 of Aggregation phase,
dose be the sum of user data in the aggregation area MA.
The authentication is produced with {sjt|(j, t) ∈ MA} and
the equation (2). According to [26], if sjt = (s1jt, s
2
jt) is the
signature of the message mjt, the signature can be verified by
calculating αmjt = (yj)s
1
jt(s1jt)
s2jt .
left =
∏
(j,t)∈MA
αmjt = α
∑
(j,t)∈MA mjt = αc,
right =
∏
(j,t)∈MA
(yj)
s1jt(s1jt)
s2jt .
If the equation left = right is working, we can consider
that c to be the sum of the user data in aggregation area MA
unless the adversary can forge a signature of ElGamal, which
was proved impossible in [26].
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C. Correctness
In aggregation phase, Ui can select to verify if c is the sum
of the cjt which (j, t) ∈ MA. Ui completes this verification
by calculating the equation (2). Then we prove the correctness
of equation (2):
αc = α
∑
(i,j)∈MAcij
=
∏
(i,j)∈MA
αcij
=
∏
(i,j)∈MA
(yj)
s1jt(s1jt)
s2jt mod p.
In fact, cij = s1jt(s
1
jt)
s2jt mod p is working according to
[26].
D. Integrity
In the proposed scheme, the message authentication codes
are used to protect the integrity of the transmitted mes-
sage, such as hi, h′i, hc. We explain the verification equation
e(hi, α) = e(H1(i||cit||sit||T ), yi) is working as following:
e(hi, α) = e(H1(i||cit||sit||T )xi , α)
= e(H1(i||cit||sit||T ), α)xi
= e(H1(i||cit||sit||T ), αxi)
= e(H1(i||cit||sit||T ), yi).
Similar to hi, the other message authentication messages
h′i, hc are also working. Moreover, if the message is modified
by an adversary, the equation is not working. And the adver-
sary cannot produce a fake hi since he/she does not have xi.
E. Privacy
In this subsection, we prove that AC can obtain the sum of
mit which (i, t) ∈MA but it cannot get any information about
mit. Firstly, we list all the data available to AC, including mit,
as follow:
cit = (c
1
it, c
2
it) = (α
ri mod p,mit + y
ri
i mod p),
pi = c−
∑
(i,t)∈MA
c1it
xi
+
∑
j∈UA
j 6=i
(j − i)yxij mod p.
Next, we explain that AC cannot calculate mit using cit, pi,
nor can it obtain mit from pi.
If AC wants to decrypt cit, AC has to get the U ′is privacy
key xi or crack the ElGamal cryptosystem. However, xi is
produced by Ui and kept secret, and ElGamal cryptosystem is
proved secure according to [26]. Therefore these two solutions
are infeasible.
AC cannot obtain mit from pi since
∑j 6=i
j∈UA(j − i)yxij is
difficult to calculate without knowing xi. Due to xi is a secret
only known by Ui, it is impossible to calculate mit from pi.
When a single farmer is required to take part in an aggre-
gation process, but if he/she is worried that the aggregation
may lead to privacy leakage, he/she can refuse to provide
TABLE II
SECURITY COMPARISON WITH OTHER SCHEMES
Li et al. Fan et
al.
Badra et
al.
DMDA Proposed
scheme
Confident Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Authentication Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Integrity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inside attack No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decentralize No No Yes Yes Yes
Dynamic No No No Yes Yes
Flexibility No No No No Yes
decryption piece. If someone in aggregation area does this,
Cloud cannot complete the aggregation even if all other
members agree to participate in the aggregation.
F. Flexibility
When CC produces the aggregation area MA, CC can
choose any data stored in Cloud. No matter which aggregation
area MA is selected, Cloud can calculate the aggregated
result with the help of related users. In fact, CC can select
several data that are owned by some different users, such as
MA = {(1, t1), (2, t2), (3, t3)}, or owned by only one farmer,
such as MA = {(1, t1), (1, t2), (1, t3)}, or mixed, such as
MA = {(1, t1), (2, t2), (2, t3)}.
Not all users take part in a data aggregation task, a farmer
is considered to take part in the process only when at least
one data of him/her is in the aggregation area.
G. Source Authentication
In the proposed scheme, it is free for users to decide whether
to verify if the aggregated result or not. In this subsection, we
prove if users want to verify the aggregated result, then they
can do it, while Cloud cannot deceive them.
According to the subsection Initial Decryption, users verify
the source by the equation as follows:
αc =
∏
(j,t)∈MA
(yj)
s1jt(s1jt)
s2jt mod p.
In this equation, we can find that if Cloud wants to forge
fake data to pass this verification, he has to produce the fake
signature (s1jt, s
2
jt) to users. However he cannot achieve this
since he does not have the private key of the connected user.
Moreover, in order to better demonstrate the superiority
of our article, the proposed scheme is compared with some
related works as Table II. By comparison, the proposed scheme
is more advantageous in terms of flexibility and dynamics
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
scheme in terms of the communication cost, storage cost as
well as calculation cost.
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TABLE III
MESSAGES LENGTH
Message Type Length
Plaintext 64 bits to 128 bits
Ciphertext 128 bits to 256 bits
Hash result 128 bits
Signature 128 bit to 256 bits
Time 64 bits
Label 64 bits
Secure key 128 bits
Public key 128 bits
Fig. 2. The relationship between transmission efficiency, the frequency
of data collection, and the length of the collected data
A. Communication Cost
In the proposed scheme, there are four communication
modes: the communication between SD and Cloud, the com-
munication between SD and user, the communication between
users and Cloud, and the communication between Cloud
and CC. Users can only control their SDs physically, while
the communication between Cloud and CC is not within
the research category of this paper. Therefore, two kinds of
communication between user and SD and between Cloud and
CC are not be discussed here. For simplicity, the length of
various messages is listed in Table III.
The communication between SD and Cloud appears in
Data Collection Phase, which SD sends the collected data
{cit, sit, hi, T} to Cloud. Because data collection is indepen-
dent of aggregation, the communication cost between SD and
Cloud is only related to the frequency of data collection and
the length of the collected data. Normally, in smart agriculture,
the length of the collected data is not very long, since the
collected data is always a PH value or a temperature value.
Moreover, users do not need collect data very frequently.
Therefore, we assume the collected data is between 64 bits
to 128 bits, and data is collected every 5 minutes to
10 minutes. According to the above assumption, the rela-
tionship between transmission efficiency, the data acquisition
frequency, and the length of the collected data is obtained, as
shown in Fig 2.
According to Fig 2, the communication efficiency of smart
devices is required to be bigger than 2.5 bits/s, which is
easy to meet in fact. Sometimes, data needs to be collected
more frequently. But even the data is upload once every 5
Fig. 3. The relationship between the length of data transmitted in
channel, the number of users, the and the length of data
seconds, the communication efficiency requirement is smaller
than 150 bits/s, which is also acceptable.
Moreover, the communication between users and Cloud
appears in Aggregation Phase. In this phase, the Cloud sends
the aggregation data {c, c1it,MA, T ′, hc} to user, and the user
chooses to verify MA, then he/she returns an application
information to Cloud, and Cloud sends {sjt|(j, t) ∈ MA}
back to user. Finally, user sends the decryption information
{pit, T ′′, h′i}. Therefore, the communication cost is related to
the number of users in the aggregation area and the length of
data. In smart agriculture, for balancing the privacy and the
data availability, the number of users is assumed to be between
50 to 100. Then we can get the relationship between the length
of data transmitted in the channel, the number of users, and
the length of data, as shown in Fig 3.
According to Fig 3, there are 4 lines here representing the
communication consumption when the user does not verify
MA and the length of data is 128 bits, the user does not verify
MA and the length of data is 64 bits, the user verifies MA
and the length of data is 64 bits, and he user verify MA and
the length of data is 128 bits. When the user does not verify
MA, the communication cost is very low, i.e. less than 7 Kb.
However, if a user wants to verify MA, the communication
cost will increase a lot, but still not exceed 25 Kb. According
to the assumption, users can use their smartphones or laptops
to participate in the protocol. Therefore, the communication
cost, which is less than 25 Kb, is acceptable.
B. Storage Cost
Users, especially their SDs, are most concerned about the
sensitivity of storage cost. In this subsection, the storage cost
of users and SDs are listed and compared with other related
schemes.
A SD only needs to store a private key and a public key
owned by Ui. Therefore, the storage cost of a smart device is
only 128 bit + 128 bit = 256 bit. Although SD only has a
limited storage resource, 256 bits is acceptable.
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TABLE IV
NOTATIONS
Notation Descriptions
Tadd Cost of an addition
Tmul Cost of a multiplication
Texp Cost of an exponential operation
Tbil Cost of a bilinear mapping operation
TH Cost of a hash operation
Ui needs to maintain a public key table containing all users’
identification numbers and public keys, therefore the storage
cost of a farmer is n × (16 bits + 256 bits) + 256 bits =
(272n+ 256) bits which n is the number of members.
According to the assumptions, Cloud has enough storage
resources, therefore we are not discussing the storage costs of
Cloud here.
C. Calculation Cost
Calculation cost is an important factor in evaluating a
security scheme. Normally, if an entity has insufficient com-
puting resources, it should undertake little calculation. In the
proposal, SDs have the least calculation resources and the
users have the second least calculation resources. Therefore,
the calculation cost of SDs and the users are discussed below.
For simplicity, some notations are defined in Table IV. The
performance evaluation is executed on a laptop with the Intel
Core i7-7700HQ CPU @2.8GHz and 8GB memory, which is
based on the PBC and Openssl libraries.
1) SDs Calculation cost: SDs only take part in Data
Collection Phase, they encrypt plaintext mit to ciphertext
cit, sign the cit using the ElGamal cryptosystem, and pro-
duce a message authentication code using a hash function
H1. The encryption and signature processes is (c1, c2) =
(αr,m+ yr) mod p,
(
s1, s2
)
=
(
αk, m−xs1k mod (p− 1)
)
.
According to the above formulas, the cost of encryption is
Tadd+2Texp and the cost of signature is Tadd+2Tmul+Texp.
Moreover the message authentication code costs Texp + TH .
Therefore SD will cost 2Tadd + 2Tmul + 4Texp +TH for once
data collection as shown in Table V. Normally, the very few
calculation costs are ignored. A data collection, including an
encryption of plaintext and a message authentication code,
only takes about 5ms. For any SD, the cost is easy to bear.
2) Users Calculation cost: Users use their laptop or smart-
phone to take part in the protocol, therefore they have
limited calculation resources. The user Ui works in Data
Aggregation Phase to initially decrypt the aggregation re-
sult. He/she verifies the message authentication code using
e(hc, α) = e(H1(c||c1it||MA||T ′), yc), calculates the decryp-
tion piece using the formula (3), and calculates the message
authentication code using h′i = H1(i||pit||T ′′)xi . According
to above formulas, the cost of verification is Tmul + 2Tbil,
the cost of decryption piece production is (2n+ ti)Tadd +
nTmul + (n+ ti)Texp, where ti is the data number of Ui
participating in this aggregation, and n is the number of users
participating in the aggregation. Each user should cost Texp+
TH to generate the authentication code. Note: the amount of
data for each user participating in the aggregation processes
may vary. Moreover, if Ui decides to verify c, he/she needs
TABLE V
COMPUTATION OVERHEAD
Entity Tadd Tmul Texp Tbil TH
SD 2 2 4 0 1
Ui without
verification
2n+ ti n+ 1 n+ ti + 1 2 1
Ui with veri-
fication
2n+ ti
∑
n ti+
n+ 1
2
∑
n ti +
n+ ti + 1
2 1
(
∑
n Ti)Tmul + 2 (
∑
n Ti)Texp extra cost. Therefore, if Ui
does not verify c, the cost of an aggregation is (2n+ ti)Tadd+
(1 + n)Tmul + (n+ ti + 1)Texp + 2Tbil + TH ; otherwise,
he/she will cost (2n+ ti)Tadd + (1 + n+
∑
n ti)Tmul +
(n+ ti + 1 + 2 (
∑
n ti))Texp + 2Tbil + TH , as listed in Ta-
ble V. When n = 100 and ti ≡ 1, in no verification case,
the user will cost 162ms, otherwise, he/she will cost 422ms.
In fact, if ti1, when the number of aggregated data
∑
n ti is
also 100, the cost will be lower. Due to users take part in
the protocol by a smartphone or laptop, the calculation cost is
easily withstanding.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a flexible privacy-preserving data
aggregation scheme base on smart agriculture, which supports
optional data aggregation in the virtual aggregation area. The
analysis shows that the proposed scheme is secure, privacy-
preserving and efficient. In the future, we plan to improve the
degree of decentralization. For example, replacing Cloud with
Block-chain.
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